Euro symbol with 12 EU Stars outside European Central Bank |
The
view from Asia
Europe
plays little strategic role in the Asian region apart from its trade
relations. Nevertheless in a globalized world everything is
interconnected. Should the euro fail, or the EU break apart, the
pain would be felt all over the globe, not least in Asia, where
economies are seemingly going from strength to strength.
Interestingly
one feature of European politics is very much the envy of many Asian
countries: the continent's institutional and procedural framework
that allows the countries of Europe to feed their problems,
conflicts, and crises into an existing mechanism with established
rules to have them fixed. However inefficient and underdeveloped that
structure might often seem to Europeans themselves, the fact that
Europe has both the EU and NATO is seen as a huge plus.
For
Europeans, this view is a big reminder of just how big the
achievements of the european integration process really are. To be
sure, Europe is flawed in many ways, and the price of being in such a
closely-knit union might appear very high at times. But essentially,
no one is out there alone. By comparison, in Asia, all existing
forums, such as APEC, ASEAN and the like, are more loosely organised
with very little binding power.
The
loneliness of nations in Asia's un-integrated region, and the
insecurity and fear it breeds, should serve as a reminder to
Europeans in this crisis of just how valuable the system they have
created for themselves is. It should also remind people that
underneath the economic narrative that so dominates the European
debate at the moment lurks a much deeper story: a story of peace and
freedom from fear, and how the European Union was the key to creating
both.
What
is needed to make the Euro work?
The
Euro will not be safe until Europe answers some fundamental questions
that it has run away from for many years. At their root is how
nations should respond to a world that is rapidlly changing around
them. What will it do as globalisation strips Europe and the US of
the monopoly over the technologies that have made it rich.
Creditor
countries want the thrust to be on national responsibility and
penalties for rule breakers. Debtors want mutual solidarity; if not
direct transfers from rich to poor then at least Eurobonds to pool
debt (the European Commission is currently studying options for
this). In short, the eurozone is badly in need of its own
"Hamiltonian moment" that is the point when Alexander
Hamilton committed the US federal government to assume the debts of
the individual states. After the adoption of America’s
constitution, Hamilton became treasury secretary. The federal
government assumed the war debts of the ex-colonies, issued new
national bonds backed by direct taxes and minted its own currency.
Hamilton’s new financial system helped transform the young republic
from a basket-case into an economic powerhouse.
America
in Hamilton’s time was a young, post-revolutionary republic. Its
founding fathers had the prestige to refashion the nation to confront
military and economic threats. Hamilton’s assumption of state debt
was contentious: virtuous states did not think they should pay for
lax ones. Allowing speculators to make fortunes from the junk debt
they had bought, often from destitute revolutionary warriors,
rankled. This all sounds rather familiar. Yet for Hamilton, assuming the debt was a
necessary price of liberty. America created political union followed
by fiscal union. The reforms of 1789 were followed by a “no-bail-out”
policy in 1840 that forced some states into default. The Federal
Reserve was set up in 1913 to act as lender of last resort. The 1930s
slump led to much-expanded federal spending under Roosevelt. American
states are now constrained by balanced-budget rules, but the federal
government borrows hugely to bolster demand. But
Europe is doing things backwards, creating the euro partly in the
hope of fostering political union. So fiscal integration is being
pushed not to preserve freedom and a new nation, but to save a
failing currency.
The
Role of Big European Countries
Restoring
Europe to health will take many years. That is because the troubled
countries need to control their government deficits and to
re-establish sound current accounts by improving their
competitiveness. The true test will be in the content of the reforms.
Germany will want to replicate its federal system, with more tough
fiscal rules and more power for the European Parliament; the French
will want a mirror of the Fifth Republic, with joint bonds issued by
the euro zone and executive power (and much discretion) left in the
hands of leaders.
Interestingly,
the German word for debt, Schulden,
is the plural of Schuld meaning
guilt or default. Germany is firmly opposed to any solution
that would imply open-ended transfers to less wealthy southerners; so are
several other northern European countries, not least because
guaranteeing others may raise their borrowing costs. But the alternative could be the end of the euro. In reality Europe needs to become more like the US which practices seamless fiscal transfers between the rich California-Connecticut-Illinois-New Jersey-New York quintuple and poorer states like Tennessee. If similar, transfers in the form of Medicaid and unemployment insurance were passed on to the weaker peripheral states, the comparable fiscal transfers may look similar to the graphic below:
Whereas
the European Union exists – somewhat superficially – as a
contractual union, in the
United Kingdom, three centuries of shared experience and a common set
of values has meant that English voters never questioned why English
taxpayers’ money was used to prop up Scottish banks in the recent
banking crisis. This essentially is the challenge for the EU to
create a similar union in a relatively young Union where nation
states remain considerable clout - to create a Union of belonging.
But
that still doesn't resolve the big question what does globalisation
mean for Europe? Does it mean Europe becoming more like Germany?
(Global banking and trade, high productivity, high taxes, high
welfare). Or more like say Texas? (Small budget, low pay, poor
welfare). Given the shift in relative wealth and cost advantage away
from Europe and the US, trying to make France, Spain, Italy and even
the UK more like Germany is improbable. Making them like Texas is
doable, but at heavy political cost. Austerity seems likely to be
with Europe for years to come, on any policy setting. Globalisation alone
will not be suffient to increase growth. Strapped as it is Europe
embodies liberal and democratic values – respect for persons, a
voice for all, some sense of social equity hence maybe the big
questions really are: does embracing globalisation mean dropping
these tiresome constraints to unfettered economic growth? And can
growth alone be counted on to spread and sustain liberal democracy in 21st century?